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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper explores the factors influencing banking outreach. Using time series data on Indian states 
for 1973-2004, the analysis indicates a divergence across states in terms of the outreach of formal 
finance over time, ceteris paribus. The findings also uncover an important role of literacy and 
physical infrastructure. As well, the findings also point to the fact that the spread and use of 
banking services can be adversely affected by unfavorable labor regulations. Robustness tests 
reinforce these findings.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Financial outreach is widely regarded as a critical factor in making financial 
products and services available to a wider segment of the population. This assumes all the 
more relevance in emerging economies where such facilities typically tend to exclude 
vast segments of the population, especially the underprivileged sections of the society. 
Cross-country evidence suggests that in several African economies, there is less than one 
bank branch per one lac people; in developed economies, these numbers are quite high. 
By way of example, UK has 18.4 branches per 100000 people, while it is even higher for 
Germany, Italy and the US (Beck et al., 2007). In contrast, Zambia has just 0.2 bank 
branches per 1000 square kilometers compared to over 600 per square kilometers in 
Singapore.  
The literature on financial sector development has primarily focused on 
measuring, assessing the determinants and evaluating the economic impact of financial 
sector depth. Presumably owing to paucity of adequate information, very little is known 
about the penetration, usage and availability of banking services across countries and 
most importantly, their determinants.   
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The paper employs India as a case study and examines the factors affecting 
banking outreach at the sub-national level. Taking on board the recent developments in 
the literature (Beck et al., 2007), it utilizes a consistent set of indicators of banking 
outreach and explores their empirical association with a set of state-level variables, such 
as those relating to its economic structure, educational attainment, infrastructure 
availability and institutional quality. 
The analysis highlights an important role for state-level variables in explaining 
banking outreach. While the importance of literacy in explaining banking outreach is 
quite pervasive, it appears from the analysis that institutional quality is an important 
factor affecting the penetration and availability of banking services, although its role in 
impacting the use of banking services is limited. As well, the analysis indicates 
significant differences in the extent of banking outreach for coastal versus land-locked 
states.   
The paper makes several contributions. First, the paper augments the evolving 
literature on banking outreach. Second, the paper belongs to the literature that explores 
the sub-national effects of greater banking outreach. Finally, the study belongs to a wider 
literature which examines the role of economic policies in influencing banking outreach.  
The sub-national governments within India offer an ideal laboratory to examine 
the different facets of banking outreach. First, like the US and several other emerging 
economies, India is a federal polity comprising of states with their own democratically-
elected governments and consequently, a measure of policy autonomy. Over time, the 
states have acquired distinct characteristics, driven by a multitude of factors, including 
their geographical location, policies pursued, the quality of infrastructure availability and 
institutional characteristics. In this process, the feasibility of the strategies pursued to 
increase banking outreach can provide practitioners with useful leads to re-design and 
fine-tune their strategies. Second, comparison of institutional and financial characteristics 
across countries is often rendered difficult owing to divergences in their historical 
experiences, institutional environment and the legal setup. Sub-national data, in contrast, 
does not suffer from such deficiencies, limiting the possibility of unobserved 
heterogeneity at the cross-section level. Third, India is one of the few important emerging 
economies with a comprehensive and reliable state-level database. The cross-sectional 
and time varying nature of the data makes it amenable to rigorous statistical analysis. The 
findings could be representative of such association among the relevant variables in other 
emerging markets as well.  
 
BANKING OUTREACH: THEORIES 
There is by now a significant volume of literature that suggests that finance 
matters for growth. Cross-country studies (Levine and Zervos, 1998) as also evidence at 
the industry (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Aghion et al., 2008) and firm (Demirgúc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998) levels offer persuasive evidence that various measures of 
financial development are positively and significantly related to economic growth (See 
Levine, 2003 for an overview). Besides, finance helps in improving income distribution 
and poverty reduction. Beck et al. (2004) uncover evidence to suggest that financial 
development causes less income inequality. Clarke et al. (2006) also finds that the level 
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of inequality declines as finance develops. Honohan (2004) shows that financial depth 
explains the level of poverty.  
 
Evidence appears to suggest that the use of financial services is positively 
correlated with economic development. In particular, the proportion of households with 
an account in a financial institution is higher in developed countries (Peachey and Roe, 
2006; Honohan, 2006; Beck et al., 2007). In addition, Beck et al. (2006b) reports that 
barriers to banking are negatively correlated with economic development. This would 
suggest that higher levels of per capita income would be associated with higher banking 
outreach. Besides, if greater use of formal financial channels can be interpreted as greater 
banking outreach, this would suggest that the initial value of banking outreach would be a 
major determinant of the current extent of banking outreach. This gives rise to our first 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: Higher per capita income levels are associated with higher banking outreach 
 
Second, the structure of the economy can have a significant bearing on banking 
outreach. Evidence appears to suggest a broad correlation between levels of banking 
outreach and levels of affluence (measured by GDP per capita), which is consistent with 
previous research (Kempson, 2006). Where affluence is high, banking outreach tends to 
be high. Taking this consideration on board, we consider the share of agriculture in the 
economy. It can be argued that higher shares of agriculture in total output is a proxy for 
poverty and high poverty would entail lower per capita incomes and consequently, lower 
banking outreach. This leads us to our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Higher share of agriculture would be associated with lower banking outreach 
 
An important demand-side factor behind financial exclusion is the low levels of 
literacy in general, and financial literacy in particular. With growing sophistication of 
financial products and services, it is becoming increasingly difficult to navigate the 
financial marketplace and compare products for their risk and rewards. As a result, 
individuals are increasingly having to assume greater responsibilities in managing their 
finances. Under these circumstances, financial education can play a critical role by 
equipping consumers with the knowledge required to choose from a myriad of financial 
products and providers. In addition, financial education can help provide individuals with 
the knowledge necessary to create household budgets, initiate savings plans, manage debt 
and make strategic investment decisions for their retirement or for their children's 
education. Financially literate customers increase the demand for, and responsible usage 
of, financial services. Being educated financially therefore enables individuals to better 
appreciate the possible contingencies and save for a rainy day, in an appropriate manner. 
Therefore, having basic financial planning skills can help families to meet their near-term 
obligations and maximize their longer-term financial well-being. This leads to our third 
hypothesis: 
 
H3: Higher levels of literacy are associated with increases in banking outreach 
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Lack of formal employment can engender additional barriers to inclusion in the 
formal sector. This will all the more be the case if there is lack of flexibility with which 
labor laws are administered (Besley and Burgess, 2004). Retrenchment of labor and 
closure of industrial units require the consent of state governments, permission on which 
might often be difficult to obtain. This could lead to sporadic incomes and make it 
difficult for individuals to accumulate savings. They tend to earn and spend their wages 
in cash, so their transactions circumvent banks.  As a result, they do not develop a 
verifiable transactions history, limiting access to formal finance. This gives rise to 
hypothesis four:  
 
H4: Higher mandays lost could lower banking outreach 
 
An obvious supply side factor hindering banking outreach is the absence of 
formal financial institutions in close proximity. For low-income households, the costs of 
visiting a branch could be prohibitive. Such costs include not only transportation costs, 
but also the loss of daily wages. Therefore, many low-income people in remote areas 
where such facilities are not available within a reasonable distance tend to rely more on 
informal markets. This would suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: Lack of adequate infrastructure could act as a hindrance in banking outreach 
 
 Finally, the quality of institutions can help stimulate growth by making the 
policy environment more business friendly through deregulation, decontrol and 
procedural simplification. Recent economic research highlights the role of institutions in 
promoting and sustaining long-run growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004). 
To the extent that higher growth translates into better per capita incomes, this would 
imply that the impact of improved institutional quality on banking outreach would be 
positive. This leads to the final hypothesis: 
H6: Improvements in institutional quality engender higher banking outreach 
 
BANKING OUTREACH: OVERVIEW AND INDIAN EXPERIENCE 
This paper is related to an emerging literature on access to financial services. 
Extant research analyzes access to financial services at the bank (Beck et al., 2006a) and 
firm (Beck et al., 2006b) levels. More recently, Beck et al. (2007) presents cross-country 
data on banking sector outreach (such as branch and ATM penetration, deposits per 
capita, and loans per capita) and show that these indicators closely track more difficult 
and costly to collect micro-level statistics of household and firm use of banking services.  
 
A detailed study by the European Commission (2008) classifies the 25 EU 
economies in terms of their level of financial exclusion and finds four transition 
economies (Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia) experiencing maximum financial 
exclusion. The number of factors that increased the odds of being financially excluded 
increased with the level of financial exclusion experienced in a country. Salient among 
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these included age, employment status and household income of the respondents. 
Evidence for the UK indicates that the percentage of financially excluded (without access 
to any kind of bank account) in 2002-03 was roughly 8%, as compared to around 3-4% 
for Australia and Canada.  
 
In the Indian case, the foundation for broad-basing the institutional credit 
structure and promoting greater financial access can be traced to the findings of the all-
India Rural Credit Survey (RBI, 1954). The findings of the Survey indicated that, out of 
the total borrowings of farmers in 1951-52 estimated at Rs. 7.5 billion, commercial banks 
provided less than 1%, while moneylenders provided 70%. The distribution of bank 
branches was also highly skewed, with nearly 38% of the bank branches being located in 
urban and metropolitan/port town locales in 1969. Even in terms of distribution of bank 
credit, the share of private corporate business exhibited an overwhelming increase, from 
44% during 1957-61 to over 60% for the quinquiennum ending 1969.   
 
TABLE 1: COMMERCIAL BANKING PROGRESS IN INDIA 
Indicators June 
1969 
December 
1980 
March 
1991 
March  
1998 
March  
2004 
Number of commercial banks 73 154 272 300 290 
  Of which:  Regional Rural Banks 
(RRBs) 
 107 196 196 196 
Number of bank offices 8262 34594 60570 66408 69170 
of which : Rural/semi-urban 
branches 
5175 23227 46115 47130 47766 
Annual growth rate (%) of    
        rural / semi-urban branches  
 
-- 
 
31.7 
 
8.9 
 
0.31 
 
0.22 
Population per bank office ('000s) 64 16 14 15 16 
Deposits of commercial banks (Rs. 
billion) 
46.5 404.4 2011.9 6054 15044 
Per capita deposit (Rs.) 88 738 2368 6270 14089 
Credit of commercial banks (Rs. 
billion) 
35.9 250.8 1218.7 3241 8408 
Per capita credit (Rs.) 68 457 1434 3356 8273 
Deposits/national income (%) 15.5 36 48.1 46.4 60 
Total Assets (Rs. billion) 68.4 710.8 3275.2 5215.4 11516.2 
Figures in brackets are branches of Regional Rural Banks 
Source: Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India, RBI (various years) 
 
These egalitarian features in the pattern of credit extension coupled with several 
other disquieting features culminated in the process of bank nationalization (See, for 
instance, Nachane et al., 2007). The first phase of nationalization, beginning July 1969, 
led to the advent of ‘social banking’ where the State took control of the banking sector 
and made it a tool for promoting social objectives. A critical ingredient of this strategy 
entailed the imposition of the 1:4 license rule in 1977, wherein banks could open a branch 
in a location with one or more branches only if it had opened four in a location with no 
branches (‘unbanked location’). Thus, over the period 1969-91, over 50,000 new bank 
branches were built, predominantly in rural locales (Table 1). The outstanding deposits of 
these branches at Rs. 678 billion (US$ 15 billion) in March 1991 constituted 35% of their 
total deposits, while loans outstanding at Rs. 438 billion (US$ 10 billion) comprised two-
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fifths of outstanding credit. As Burgess and Pande (2005) demonstrate, by improving 
access to cheap formal credit for the rural poor, this redistributive nature of branch 
expansion strategy made a significant dent on rural poverty. 
 
The second phase of public policy towards promoting greater banking outreach 
can be traced to the inception of financial sector reforms in 1991. Salient features of this 
period included higher allocation of credit to private sector, lower pre-emptions by the 
government sector, moving away from administered to market-determined interest rates 
both for commercial and government borrowings, increased competitiveness with entry 
of de novo private banks and liberal entry of foreign banks. The ‘market discipline’ 
wrought in through broad-basing the equity base of state-owned banks made them 
consciously focus on their bottomlines, contain delinquent loans, introduce better risk 
management practices and extend banking outreach through better adoption of 
information technology (Chairlone and Ghosh, 2009). Although priority sector lending 
norms exist, the norms have progressively been expanded to encompass increasing 
number of sectors and activities. In a sense, the period has demonstrated that policies for 
inclusive banking have to exist concurrently with encouraging strong and efficient 
financial institutions.  
 
Several important features of the strategy towards promoting inclusive banking 
during this period deserve mention. The first was the initiation of the Self Help Group 
(SHG)-Bank linkage program in 1992. The initial progress of the program was lackluster 
with only 32,995 groups being credit-linked during 1992-99. Since then, the pace of the 
program accelerated with the cumulative number of SHGs financed increasing from 0.1 
million to 1.1 million during the four-year period ending March 31, 2004 and cumulative 
bank lending amounted to Rs. 39 billion (US$ 0.9 billion). 
 
Second, a system of Kisan Credit Cards (Kisan, meaning farmer) was initiated 
in 1999 to provide adequate and timely financial support in a flexible and cost-effective 
manner from the banking system to farmers for cultivation needs and purchase of inputs. 
Till 2004, a total of 9.3 million such cards have been issued with amount outstanding of 
nearly Rs. 380 billion.   
 
On a broader plane, the Indian central bank has adopted a two-pronged strategy 
to generate greater awareness and expand the reach of banking services – which can be 
termed as empowerment and protection. As regards the former, banking outreach is the 
first stage of the process. This has been buttressed by inculcating awareness among the 
masses about financial products through financial education. Concurrently, an advisory 
mechanism in the form of credit counseling has been encouraged to help distressed 
borrowers and bring them within the fold of formal finance. As regards protection, a 
Banking Codes and Standards Board of India (BCSBI) have been established recently to 
ensure a comprehensive code of conduct for minimum standards of banking services to 
be offered by banks. In addition, a Banking Ombudsman Scheme has been instituted to 
redress deficiencies in customer service by banks.  
 
BANKING OUTREACH IN INDIAN STATES: STYLIZED FACTS 
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We begin the analysis by providing an overview of banking outreach across 
states.1 Following from Beck et al. (2007), we utilize the following indicators of banking 
sector outreach at the state-level: 
 
(a) geographic outreach: number of bank branches per 1000 sq. km 
(b) Loan accounts per capita: number of loan accounts per 1000 people 
(c) Loan-income ratio: average size of loans to per capita net state domestic product 
(NSDP) 
 
In particular, we focus exclusively on banking outreach for two major reasons. 
First, in a majority of countries including India, it is the banking sector that intermediates 
most of the funds in the economy: bank asset to GDP stood at over 80% in 2004. Second, 
consistent statistical information is available primarily for this sector as compared to 
other non-bank service providers.  
The indicators listed above take on board the three major dimensions of banking 
outreach: penetration, availability and usage.  
We also examine the extent of banking outreach across states. For expositional 
simplicity, we classify the states on a three-fold criteria: income, region and geography. 
In our subsequent analysis, we employ dummies to examine differences in banking 
outreach across these classifications. Specifically, high-income states are as defined by 
World Bank (2005) and corroborate the earlier classification by Sachs et al. (2002a) and 
Ahluwalia (2002). Likewise, states have also been classified according to regions, 
following RBI (2007) and finally, as coastal or hinterland (Government of India, 2008a).2  
The evidence indicates significant differences in both geographic and 
demographic inclusion across high- and low-income states; similar evidence is manifest 
in case of deposit and loan accounts as well. There is also evidence to suggest limited use 
of deposit services in the low-income states (Beck et al., 2007). By way of example, the 
mean deposit/income ratio in the low-income states is 3.78 as compared to 2.54 in the 
high-income states. The difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
In terms of regional divergence, the differences in demographic inclusion and 
deposit accounts per capita are substantial. Illustratively, the number of bank office per 
100000 people is the highest at 7.67 in the Southern region as compared with 4.73 in the 
Eastern region. This difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The differences 
in loan accounts per capita are significantly higher in the Southern as compared to other 
regions; both deposit-income ratio and loan-income ratio exhibits limited divergence 
across regions. The evidence is consistent with recent findings which reports significant 
regional variation in the provision of financial services (Basu, 2006; Government of 
India, 2008b). Finally, across most indicators, coastal states exhibit higher levels of 
banking outreach; only in case of loan accounts per capita, the difference is observed to 
be statistically significant.  These raw correlations however, do not control for state 
characteristics or the business cycle.  
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TABLE 2: BANKING OUTREACH ACROSS STATES 
Variables Bank office/ 
1000 sq. km 
Loan/ 
Income 
Deposit account/ 
1000 people 
N.Obs 
Panel A: Income     
High income 28.77 (19.56) 16.45 (22.21) 61.75 (36.10) 72 
Low income 14.70 (9.81) 16.85(25.10) 37.97 (27.33) 40 
t-test for difference 5.06*** -0.08 3.92***  
Panel B: Region     
Northern  23.75 (15.63) 17.79(21.39) 41.83 (22.12) 24 
Southern 32.69 (23.94) 18.03(16.56) 84.63 (32.51) 32 
Western 23.29 (5.25) 24.90(24.77) 36.39 (16.22) 16 
Eastern 13.30 (15.71) 20.78(33.78) 45.37 (35.16) 24 
Central 16.95 (9.87) 17.42(23.58) 36.33 (31.14) 16 
t-test for difference     
Northern v. Southern 1.69 * -2.17 ** -5.85***  
Northern v. Western 3.04 *** -0.93 0.89  
Northern v. Eastern 0.09 -0.36 -0.41  
Northern v. Central 1.69 * 0.05 0.61  
Southern v. Western 4.38 *** -2.69 *** 6.86***  
Southern v. Eastern 1.77 * -1.83 * 4.27***  
Southern v. Central 3.21 *** -1.57 4.99***  
Western v. Eastern -2.89 *** 0.44 -1.09  
Western v. Central -1.31 0.87 0.07  
Eastern v. Central 1.57 0.37 0.85  
Panel C: Location     
Coastal 25.63 (20.71) 14.83(20.93) 64.64 (37.24) 64 
Land-locked 21.23 (13.41) 18.94(25.89) 38.08 (25.05) 48 
t-test for difference 1.36 -0.89 4.51***  
Panel D: Reforms     
Pre reforms 19.41 (15.64) 24.42(26.39) 43.57 (33.14) 70 
Post reforms 30.97 (19.51) 13.54(11.57) 69.40 (32.45) 42 
t-test for difference -3.26*** 6.59*** -4.05***  
Standard deviation within parentheses  
*** significance at 1%; ** significance at 5%; * significance at 10% 
 
The differences in banking outreach for the pre- and post-reform period is also 
striking. The evidence indicates a significant improvement in both geographic and 
demographic inclusion; as well, the values of both deposit-income and loan-income ratio 
have declined, signifying greater outreach of banking services.  
Although the present analysis represents perhaps the first systematic attempt to 
analyze banking outreach at the state-level, it is not without its limitations, either. First, 
the focus is primarily on banking exclusion; other dimensions of financial exclusion, such 
as price exclusion, marketing exclusion and self-exclusion have not been addressed. As 
Claessens (2006) observes, for communities with limited access to financial products, 
this process becomes self-reinforcing and is often an important factor in social exclusion. 
Additionally, the measures of financial exclusion considered are not devoid of certain 
shortcomings, either. By way of illustration, an individual or firm may receive more than 
one loan or have multiple deposit accounts, so that the number of loans and deposits 
accounts is far from being a perfect proxy of the number of people using these services 
within a state. Likewise, the average size of loans and deposits to per capita NSDP might 
not be representative of the value of services that a typical individual might receive.  
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DATA AND VARIABLES 
For the analysis, we use state-level data for the period 1973-2004. We selected 
this time period for several reasons. First, it seems sufficiently long to allow long-run 
influences to play out. Second, the period coincides with the availability of consistent 
data on the concerned variables at the state level to clearly discern the impact of banking 
outreach on state level growth.  
The dependent variables are the banking outreach indicators as discussed earlier. 
We sequentially introduce these indicators and ascertain the impact of various state-level 
factors on the banking outreach indicators. The initial value of the variable is included to 
examine convergence: if states with higher initial values of the variable exhibit higher 
outreach, this would entail a positive sign on the coefficient.  
Following from our earlier discussion, we introduce a set of economic variables 
to ascertain their impact on banking outreach. Most of these variables have been 
employed by previous researchers in their analysis of Indian states (Ahluwalia, 2002; 
Purfield, 2006; Besley and Burgess, 2004; Kochhar et al., 2006; Gupta et al., 2009).  
First, we include the level of per capita income to test whether high-income states display 
higher banking outreach (Hypothesis 1). Second, we capture the state economic structure 
by including the ratio of agriculture in NSDP (Hypothesis 2). Third, we capture the 
quality of human capital by including the literacy rate (Hypothesis 3). Fourth, the 
industrial relations climate in a state is captured by including the ratio of mandays lost 
per worker (Hypothesis 4). Fifth, we include the logarithm of roads per 1000 square 
kilometers as a proxy for the availability of physical infrastructure (Hypothesis 5). 
Finally, as a measure of the institutional quality, we consider the transmission and 
distribution (T&D) losses of state electricity boards, or SEBs (Hypothesis 6).  
 
 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS 
Regression specification 
The univariate tests conducted earlier do not control for factors that might 
systematically impact state-level banking outreach. First, state-level controls are not 
accounted for. The pace of economic activity could also be an important consideration. 
Taking these aspects into account, we estimate the effect of various factors on state-level 
banking outreach. The regression specification for state s at time t assumes the following 
form: 
tsttsts
tstststststs
GDPDTRoads
MDLLitAgrPCNSDPOutreachOutreach
,8,7,6
,5,4,3,21,1,
& νααα
ααααα
+++
+++++= −      (1) 
In (1), the dependent variable (Outreach) is assumed to be a function of lagged 
outreach and a vector of state state-level controls, including measures of its economic 
structure (NSDP per capita, PCNSDP and share of agriculture, Agr), educational 
attainment (literacy rate, Lit), physical infrastructure (roads per 1000 sq. kms, Roads), 
institutional quality (transmission and distribution losses, T&D) and industrial climate 
(mandays lost, MDL). We control for the business cycle by including real GDP growth 
and finally, ν denotes the error term.  
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Given the possible endogenenity of several of the explanatory variables, the 
econometric analysis utilizes a generalized method of moment (GMM) dynamic panel 
estimate to assess the relationship between state-level variables and measures of banking 
outreach. The GMM estimator has the advantage that it allows past realizations of the 
dependent variable to affect its current level, using lagged levels of the dependent and 
predetermined variables. Dummies for real GDP growth are included to account for time-
specific effects.  
 
Results and Discussion 
In Panel A, the coefficient on initial inclusion is 0.07, which suggests that, on 
average, states with higher bank branches (in relation to their area) to start with witness 
increases in geographic inclusion. This result resonates across almost all specifications. 
What this indicates is a divergence across states in terms of banking outreach over time, 
ceteris paribus.  
 
TABLE 3: SELECT REGRESSION RESULTS OF BANKING OUTREACH 
Panel A:  
Geographic 
Level of 
development 
Economic 
structure 
Human 
capital 
Industrial 
climate 
Physical 
infrastructure 
Institutional 
quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.015 
(0.006)*** 
-0.026 
(0.013)** 
-0.009 
(0.404)*** 
0.002 (0.004) -0.010 
(0.004)*** 
Initial outreach 0.068 
(0.021)*** 
0.089 
(0.053)* 
0.077 
(0.045)* 
0.048 
(0.053) 
0.011 (0.028) 0.062 
(0.051) 
PCNSDP -0.072 
(0.017)*** 
 -0.091 
(0.530) 
   
Agriculture  -0.068 
(0.039)* 
    
Literacy   0.302 
(0.079)*** 
   
Mandays    0.007 
(0.006) 
  
Roads     0.174 
(0.037)*** 
 
T&D losses      -0.036 
(0.021)* 
GDPGR 0.686 
(0.211)*** 
0.835 
(0.328)*** 
-1.118 
(0.309)*** 
0.679 
(0.326)** 
1.259 
90.242)*** 
0.832 
(0.177)*** 
Merger 0.014 
(0.055) 
0.053 
(0.054) 
0.003 
(0.086) 
0.044 
(0.049) 
-0.006 
(0.057) 
0.081 
(0.039)** 
States, N.Obs 14, 84 14, 84 14, 84 14, 84 14, 84 14, 83 
Sargan test (p-Value)  0.919  0.925 0.929 0.898 0.971 0.866 
AR 1, AR 2 (p-Value) 251, 0.234 0.235, 0.252 0.257, 0.153 0.218, 0.251 0.295, 0.205 0.217, 
0.254 
Panel B:  
Loan a/c pc 
      
Constant -0.028 
(0.008)*** 
-0.053 
(0.008)*** 
-0.019 
(0.007)*** 
-0.044 
(0.009)*** 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
Initial outreach 0.381 
(0.056)*** 
0.368 
(0.031)*** 
0.368 
(0.032)*** 
0.382 
(0.076)*** 
0.450 
(0.112)*** 
0.437 
(0.091)*** 
PCNSDP 0.019 
(0.059) 
     
Agriculture  -0.259     
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(0.046)*** 
Literacy   -0.163 
(0.058)*** 
   
Mandays    -0.086 
(0.023)*** 
  
Roads     -0.188 
(0.044)*** 
 
T&D losses      -0.177 
(0.062)*** 
GDPGR -1.755 
(0.415)*** 
-1.456 
(0.277)*** 
-1.029 
(0.393)*** 
-1.185 
(0.340)*** 
-0.740 
(0.326)** 
-2.169 
(0.322)*** 
Merger -0.206 
(0.057)*** 
-0.116 
(0.093) 
-0.178 
(0.084)** 
-0.227 
(0.074)*** 
-0.108 
(0.101) 
-0.085 
(0.064)* 
States, N.Obs 14, 84 14, 84 14, 84 14, 84 14, 84 14, 83 
Sargan test (p-Value)  0.854 0.888 0.872 0.860 0.897 0.871 
AR 1, AR 2 (p-Value) 0.157, 0.439 0.157, 0.708 0.170, 0.765 0.160, 0.579 0.172, 0.030 0.165, 
0.437 
Panel C:  
Loan/ Income 
      
Constant 0.111 
(0.025)*** 
0.070 
(0.046) 
0.063 
(0.033)* 
0.116 
(0.036)*** 
0.115 
(0.055)** 
0.122 
(0.049)*** 
Initial outreach 0.151 
(0.032)*** 
0.138 
(0.036)*** 
0.145 
(0.044)*** 
0.162 
(0.035)*** 
0.149 
(0.049)*** 
0.125 
(0.042)*** 
PCNSDP -0.211 
(0.099)*** 
     
Agriculture  0.128 
(0.103) 
    
Literacy   -0.437 
(0.243)* 
   
Mandays    0.091 
(0.030)*** 
  
Roads     -0.052 
(0.186) 
 
T&D losses      0.261 
(0.175) 
GDPGR -0.408 
(0.097)*** 
-0.347 
(0.107)*** 
-0.657 
(0.135)*** 
-0.489 
(0.119)*** 
-0.298 
(0.194) 
-0.361 
(0.109)*** 
Merger 0.109 
(0.084) 
0.221 
(0.101)** 
0.217 
(0.091)*** 
0.188 
(0.079)*** 
0.144 (0.091) 0.203 
(0.086)*** 
States, N.Obs 14, 84 14, 84 14, 84 14, 84 14, 84 14, 83 
Sargan test (p-Value)  0.583 0.482 0.499 0.559 0.554 0.526 
AR 1, AR 2 (p-Value) 0.126, 0.501 0.188, 0.430 0.173, 0.230 0.180, 0.308 0.193, 0.350 0.192, 
0.471 
Standard errors within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
AR(1) and AR(2) denote the first and second order autocorrelation and follow N (0,1) 
 
The coefficient on PCNSDP is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. In other words, states with higher levels of economic development exhibit lower 
geographic inclusion. Without loss of generality, it seems likely that economically 
developed states are those which already have high branch presence. Besides the 
economic significance, the magnitude is statistically meaningful, as well: a one standard 
deviation rise in PCNSDP lowers geographic inclusion by roughly 1.5 standard deviation.   
The coefficient on Agr is negative, attesting to the fact that states with greater 
shares of agriculture display lower geographic outreach. In terms of magnitude, a 10% 
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rise in agriculture share lowers geographic inclusion by roughly 0.7 percentage points. 
This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 which indicates that higher agriculture share would 
entail lower geographic outreach. 
The results obtaining in specification (3) appear to indicate that literacy is an 
important factor behind geographic inclusion. The coefficient on literacy is positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level, highlighting the importance of literacy in general in 
improving geographic inclusion. In order to gauge the economic relevance of this 
variable, we perform a standard comparative dynamics exercise. Specifically, we 
compute the total impact on geographic inclusion if we are moving from a state at the 
10th percentile of the distribution of literacy to a state at the 90th percentile. The effect 
on geographic inclusion based on the estimated coefficients in the regression in Panel A 
(Model 1) is positive.4 The evidence thus indicates that the effect of literacy is, on 
average, positive and significant, both statistically and economically.  This lends 
credence to the hypothesis that literacy exerts a salutary effect on banking outreach.  
In the final two specification, the coefficient on both roads and T&D losses have 
expected signs, which suggests that both the paucity of physical infrastructure as also 
inadequate institutional quality are a major hindrance in the quest for greater geographic 
inclusion. All specifications control for the impact of mergers during the post-reform 
period. Wherever significant, the coefficient bears expected signs. The specification tests 
of the model indicate that the model is well-specified.   
Panel B focuses on loan accounts per capita, a proxy measure for the use of 
banking services. More often than not, literacy and infrastructure draw significant 
attention presumably owing to their visible impact on banking outreach. Labor 
regulations however are observed to be important as well. By constraining output and 
employment, protective employment regulations can also hinder banking outreach. 
Consider, by way of example, Model 4 in Panel B. The coefficient on mandays is -0.086, 
which suggests that a rise in mandays lost by 10% lowers the use of loan accounts by 
about 1 percentage point.  
The final panel explores the use of banking services relative to the level of 
development. Higher values for the average size of loans or deposits relative to income 
would signify that banking services are more limited in use, implying lower banking 
outreach. Wherever significant, the coefficients bear expected signs.  
In separate regressions (not reported), we also included dummy variables 
according to state characteristics such as income, region and location, besides the various 
state-level variables as earlier.5 The results lend credence to the univariate findings of 
significant differences in banking outreach across income and regional characteristics. 
While the differences in income permeated across all indicators of banking outreach, in 
case of regional characteristics, the difference was particularly striking for Eastern region 
as compared to Southern and Western regions. This concurs with the evidence of 
substantial regional differences in financial services in India (See, RBI,. 2009). 
Consistent with Sachs and Bajpai (2005), loan accounts per capita appear to be 
significant higher for coastal (as compared to land-locked) states. This is not surprising, 
given the high growth of export-oriented units along the coast (Sachs et al., 2002a; 
2002b). Contextually as well, the hinterland in China also experienced lower economic 
growth compared to the coastal regions and this seems to have widened over the last two 
decades. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The paper makes a systematic attempt to ascertain the factors influencing 
banking outreach at the sub-national level. Borrowing from the literature, we employ 
measures of banking outreach that capture the penetration, use and availability of banking 
services. We subsequently examine the factors that impact banking outreach, using data 
on major states in India covering the period 1973 to 2004.   
The analysis indicates significant regional divergences in banking outreach 
across states, as also in terms of their income characteristics. More importantly, the 
multivariate regressions indicate an important role of literacy and infrastructure in 
explaining banking outreach. We thus complement the extant literature on sub-national 
economies by providing a rationale behind the high growth of certain states/ regions vis-
à-vis others.6 
The analysis also suggests a role for improving labor regulations. More often 
than not, educational attainment and infrastructure development draw significant 
attention, owing to their visible impact on banking outreach. Labor regulations however 
are observed to be important as well. By constraining output and employment, protective 
employment regulations can also hinder banking outreach. While the importance of 
financial development for industrial growth is well-documented (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998), the present analysis suggests a reverse link from growth to finance: rigid state-
level labor regulations could hold back industrial growth and in turn, impede banking 
outreach.  
Attaining the millennium development goals is an important objective for 
policymakers worldwide (UNDP, 2008). Central to this process is the promotion of 
inclusive growth. Globally, policymakers across countries and continents are making 
concerted efforts to achieve inclusive growth (Government of India, 2008b; HM 
Treasury, 2007; Weingarten, 2007; European Commission, 2008). The Indian experience 
with regard to banking outreach testifies to this point.   
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